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ABSTRACT
In the absence of major policy changes, federal government budget
deficits will probably constitute a serious impediment to any increase in
the U.S. economy's net investment rate, and may even depress the investment
rate still further, during the latter 1980s. The U.S. Government's
outstanding debt is now rising sharply in relation to gross national product,
and, undereithercurrent legislation or the budget policies proposed by
the.ragan Administration, itwillcontinue to do so. This sustained
upwardmovement of the government debt ratio will be unprecedented in
U.S. peacetime experience. Because government debtand private-sector
debt have historically moved inverselyin relation togross national product
in the United States, a rising government debt ratio over time implies a
sustained contraction of private debt relative to the economy's size. This
reduction in the private sector's relative debt position in turn implies a
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The prospect of a large andpersistentgovernment budget deficit
during the balance of the l980s has become the focus of intense public
policy concern in the United States. This widespread anxiety has stemmed
from the experience of actually realized U.S. Government deficits in the
earlyyears of the decade, as well as from the growing awareness of a
persistent imbalancebetween the government's revenues andexpenditures.
Thefederal deficit in the 1983 fiscal year reached a peacetime record
level, not just in absolute dollars but in relation to the size of the
U.S. economy. Moreover, ithasbecome apparent that, under the policies
ineffect as of the time of writing, the deficit will not shrink over time,
even as the economy recovers from the severe effects of the two business
recessions that marked the onset of the 1980s. It is also now apparent
(if it ever was not) that such politically popular actions as cutting
income tax rates or trimming "wasteful, fraudulent and abusive" elements
ofgovernment spending will not eliminate the deficit either.
One of the most important reasons why this large and growing govern-
ment deficit represents a cause for alarm is its negative implications
for the economy's ability to undertake fixed capital formation and thereby
to achieve rapid growth of productivity and, ultimately, the population's
standard of living. Capital formation is sufficiently central to the economy's
development prospects overall, and the potential links between it and
government saving or dissaving are sufficiently important, that the threat
to capital formation stands out as one of the leading elements underlying—2—
theconcern that the spreading realization of the deficit problemhas
prompted.
The connection to capital investment is hardly the only reason why
numerous diverse constituencies have reacted sharply tothe emerging
deficit prospects, of course. Fears of a re—acceleration of priceinflation,
for example, stand out prominently in this regard. Althoughit is strictly
correct, in an analytical sense, to distinguish betweenthe respective
inflationary consequences of government debt issues and moneycreation,
for practical purposes it is naive to suppose thatthe political and
societal pressures which lead to large deficits over many yearswill not
also affect the posture of monetary policy. For reasons morepolitical
than economic, therefore, a decade marked by continuing largegovernment
deficits is also likely to be an inflationary era.The primary focus of
this paper, however, is the implication of a continuingdeficit for the
u.s. capital formation process.
The role of physical capital formation in enhancingproductivity
has always been an elusive subject for economists. At anabstract level
the contribution of plant and equipment to workers'ability to generate
output appears obvious enough. Yet accountingfor historical productivity
growth in any precise way has proved problematical,and the extra produc—
tivity growth likely to result from additional capitalinvestment in the
future is correspondingly difficult to quantify.
More specifically, what is clear is thatsince the late l960s
the U.S. economy's net capital formation rate hasfallen by almost any
measure.After allowance for depreciation andobsolescence (but not for
investmentinpollution control), the United Statesdevoted an average 35%
of its gross national product to increasingits net stock of fixed—3—
nonresidential capital during 1961-70, but only 3.0% during 1971-80 (and
even less during the subsequent recession years). As a combined result
of the decline in the capital formation rate and the unusually large
growth of the labor force which took place over these same years, the
amount of capital per worker in the U.S. economy's private sector grew
by 3.2% per annum on average during 1961-70, but only 1.3% per annum
during 1971—80. At the same time, the economy's productivity growth
slowed from 2.8% per annum on average during 1961-70 to only 1.4% per annum
during l971_80) What is unclear is how much faster productivity would
have grown if capital formation had not slowed (but other adverse develop-
ments, like energy price increases and business recessions, had occurred
as they did historically). What is also unclear, therefore, is what
marginal impact on productivity growth during the balance of the l980s
would follow from, say, a restoration of the net nonresidential capital
formation rate to 3.5% of gross national product as in the 1960s, versus
a continuation of the 2.4% rate realized in 1981—82 (or possibly even lower).2
The potential role of a greater capital stock in spurring aggregate
productivity growth is not the only rationale underlying the widespread
support for an increased u.s. capital formation rate during the l980s,
but the other dimensions of the subject are, if anything, even harder to
quantify. Familiar questions like whether the United States should continue
to have a major position in the world steel industry, or whether the nation
should move more vigorously toward energy independence, or whether it
shouldpursue a sharply accelerated shift of production into "high technology"
areas —eachan interesting and important issue on its ownare also
allquestions about the magnitude and the composition of the economy's
capital formation. In addition to whatever more specific public policy—4—
measures may help to determine the resolution of each of these issues1
the general economic and financial environment that either fosters or
impedes fixed capital formation overall will importantly affect all of them.
Thestance of fiscal policy, as summarized in part by the path of the
U.S.Government'sbudget deficit, will in turn be a central element
importantly shaping that environment.
Theobject of this paper is to assess the prospects for this
interaction, between capital formation and the government deficit in the
United States during the remainder of the l980s, and in particular to
consider potential budgetary choices from the perspective of their likely
effect on the economy's capital formation rate. To anticipate, the paper's
examination of the most likely prospects for this interaction indicates
that, in the absence of new policy directions and initiatives, the macro-
economic effects of U.S. fiscal policy will probably place unprecedentedly
severe strains on the economy's ability to undertake new capital formation
in the medium—run future. By contrast, an alternative fiscal policy stance
consistent with maintaining or even enhancing the nation's capital formation
ratewould probably require a combination of individually important changes.
Section I reviews, with specific reference to prospects for the
1980s,the economics of the connection between government deficits and
private capital formation. Section II builds on this analysis to consider
specific policies for limiting the deficit to a level consistent with
preserving capital formation. A novelty of the analysis here is its use
of the ratio of the government's outstanding debt to the economy's gross
national product as a benchmark measure summarizing the implications for
private financing, and hence for private capital formation, of any given
deficit path through time. Section III extends the analysis to consider—5—
two potentially important aspects of fiscal policy not directly incorporated
within the narrow lens provided by the overall budget deficit per se,
including the composition of the government's spending and the composition
of its liabilities. Section IV briefly summarizes the paper's major
conclusions and policy recommendations.—6—
I. The Interaction Between Capital Formation and Government Deficits
The U.S. economy has traditionally allocated aiDout one—sixth of each
year's total output to investment for the future. Considered in isolation,
without any benchmark reference points, this fraction appears neither
large nor small. Most families would be pleased if they could set aside
a sixth of their incomes to provide for their future needs, and few manage
to do so. The saving problem from the overall economy's perspective is not
the same as the saving problem from the perspective of an individual
family, however, since the economy must be self—sufficient in ways that
few families ever are. In comparison with an individual family, the
aggregate economy has not only a richer set of opportunities to savebut
also a broader range of claims on whatever saving it does.
Table 1 summarizes the experience of the U.S. economy in this regard
since 1955 by showing the relationship among the main elements of its
saving and investment, stated throughout as percentages of grossnational
product. The data in the table condense the 1956—80 experienceinto
averages for successive five—year periods, but show the morerecent
experience during 1981 and 1982 separately. The upper part ofthe table
details the economy's sources of gross saving, while the lower part relates
this saving to its use for gross investment (which equals gross saving
except for statistical discrepancies).
what is most striking about the economy's saving behavior as shown
in Table 1 is, first, the relative lack of variation in the total saving
experience over the past quarter century and, second, the sharp departure
from prior experience associated with the large federal governmentdeficit
in 1982. Contrary to the usual impression of declining private saving,





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in recent decades, hovering closely around an average 16.7% of gross
national product. Within the total of gross private saving, personal
saving has remained equally steady around an average 4.7% of grossnational
product. The retained earnings of corporate businesses,measured net of
taxes, depreciation and artificial inventory profits dueto the use of
first—in—first—out accounting methods, have declined sharply relative to
gross national product during the last decade,but the relative growth of
depreciation allowances (adjusted to reflect true economicdepreciation)
has more than offset that decline. In sum, the economy's gross private
saving has actually grown slightly in comparison to itstotal output.
Because more than all of the increase has consisted of depreciation,
however, the economy's net private saving (equal to gross privatesaving
less depreciation) has declined in relative terms.
The private sector, including both households and businesses,is
not the only source of saving. The economy's total savingconsists
of private saving plus the saving —or,importantly, the dissaving —
ofgovernment. In large part because of the surplusesassociated with
funding the pensions of teachers and other employees,state and local
governments have increasingly added to total grosssaving since the mid
1960s.3 By contrast, the federal government's budget deficit has grown
steadily over this period —froma balanced budget on average during the
1950s, to average deficits of Q5% and 1.9% of grossnational product
in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively, to a peacetime record4.9% of gross
national product in 1982. This growth of dissaving bythe federal govern-
ment has more than balanced the growth of saving bystate and local govern-
ments, so that the economy's total savinghas not kept pace with its private
saving. In 1982 the total gross saving rate wasat its lowest point since—8—
WorldWar II. Because saving is what finances investment, so too was
the total gross investment rate.
Although the u.s. economy's total gross investment rate has shown
little change (actually a small increase) in recent years, except for
1982, what presumably matters for productivity growth is not total invest-
ment but only the additions to productive plant and equipment —and,
moreover,not gross investment but investment net of depreciation. New
installations that merely replace earlier ones which have worn out through
time and usage, or which have become obsolete as technologies change, do
notrepresent further accumulation of capital. In the sense that matters
here, therefore, the part of saving offset by depreciation correspondingly
does not represent a genuine setting aside of the economy's resources to
providefor its future. What matters instead is net saving and net invest-
ment.
Table 2 indicates the composition of gross private domestic investment,
as shown in Table 1, among business plant and equipment, residential
construction, and inventory accumulation. In addition, for the plant and
equipment component the table shows the mix of depreciation and net
investment comprising the gross investment total.4 Except for the early
1960s and again in 1982, gross investment in plant and equipment has now
shownasteady increase in relation to gross national product for several
decades. Once again, however, more than all of this long-term increase
has consisted of a relative growth of depreciation allowances, due to the
economy's rising overall capital intensity and to the progressive change
in the composition of the capital stock away from (longer—lived) plant
toward (shorter-lived) equipment.5


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as a share of gross national product during the l960s but then fell just
as sharply during the l970s. The 2.0% recorded in 1982 closely approached
the lowest net investment rate for plant and equipment that the U.S.
economy has experienced since. World War II (1.8% in 1958). Moreover, this
deterioration in the economy's net investment in relation to gross national
product has also corresponded to a deterioration in comparison to the
existing capital stock. From a peak of 4.7% per annum on average during
1966—70, the growth rate of the U.S. economy's net stock of private
nonresidential capital declined to 3.9% per annum on average during 1971-81,
and only 2.4% in 1982.
In the context of this deteriorating investment performance, the
immediate source of current alarm about the federal government's budget
is the prospect that, even after the economy completes its recovery from
the 1980 and 1981—82 business recessions, the federal deficit in relation
to gross national product will not return even to the level of the l970s,
much less to the more nearly balanced budget experience of the 1950s and
l960s. Without policy changes, the Reagan Administration's 1983 estimates
indicate an increase in the total federal deficit (including a small amount
of "off—budget" outlays) to 7.1% of gross national product in each of the
1983 and 1984 fiscal years, followed by a decline only to 6.4% of gross
national product in fiscal year 1988 despite a projected recovery to a
6.5% unemployment rate in that year.6
The likelihood of large and growing government deficits in the
remainder of the 1980s therefore calls into question the economy's ability
to achieve significant progress in increasing its net capital formation
rate, and even raises the prospect that the decline shown in Table 2 may
continue still further. Although the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 included—10—
several measures intended to stimulate private saving, the data shown in
Table 1 suggest that the share of private saving in the U.S. economy
exhibits only limited responsiveness. More sophisticated econometric
investigations typically confirm this casual impression.7 Moreover,
even if these tax measures succeeded in increasing the gross private
saving rate by fully one-half —thatis, from the historical average
4.7% of gross national product to an unprecedented 7.1% —thatstill
would not be nearly sufficient to fundtheprojected increase in the
federal deficit andalsofinance private capital formation even at its
recently depressed pace.
What is the economic process by which growing federal budget deficits
cansoimpair the economy's ability to undertake private capital formation?
The answer depends, in the first instance, on whether the government
deficit itself is the result of an active fiscal policy that sets the
government's expenditures in excess of even the level of revenuesit would
achieve if the economy were operating normally or, alternatively, the
result of a depressed economy. In addition, the answer depends importantly
on what posture monetary policy assumes in conjunction with fiscal policy.
Table 3 presents data comparing the actual federal government
budget surplus or deficit realized during the past quarter centuryto the
surplus or deficit that would have ensued, under unchanged legislation,
if the economy had been at "high employment." The upper part of the table
compares the actual and hypothetical budget totalsin dollar magnitudes.
The lower part compares the actual budget outcome measured as a percentage
of actual gross national product, as shown in Table 1, to the corresponding






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since1955 more than three-fourths of the cumulated actual federal
deficit has merely reflected the smaller government revenues that accompany
reduced incomes, together with the additional government spendingintended
to supplement reduced incomes, in periods of weak overall economicactivity.
The distinction between active and passive deficits was especially important
in 1981 and 1982, the years of what was by many measures the most severe
business recession since the 1930s. The passive response of revenuesand
spendingaccounted for more than all of the realized federal deficitin
1981, andformore than four-fifths of the realized deficit in1982.
Whena government deficit emerges as a passiveresult of a weakened
economy, it carries little if any indication that fiscal policy is retarding
private capital formation. Such a passive deficit is simply the mirror
image of the excess of private saving that always accompanies (in some
senses, defines) a recession in the firstplace.8 For this reason it is
difficult to blame the weakness of U.S. capital formation in 1981 and 1982
on the enlarged federal deficit. The more plausible interpretation of the
experience of the past two years is, instead, just the opposite —that
the weakness of business investment, by contributing to the severity of
the recession (while also being affected by the recession, of course),
caused the deficit to be larger than it would have been otherwise.
The problem confronting U.S. capital formation during the balance
of the 1980s is different, however. If the deficit were merely passive,
it would shrink and ultimately disappear in the course of the business
recovery. Instead, nearly all estimates indicate that without policy
changes the deficit will grow larger. Over time, therefore, the growing
deficit will increasingly represent not a passive but an active deficit.
In contrast to 1982, when less than 20% of the deficit was active inthis—12—
sense, the Reagan Administration has estimated that even by 1984 more than
70% of the deficit will be its active component, and by 1987 the active
component will be more than 90%.
When the government runs a deficit even though the economy is fully
employed, the most basic reason why private capital formation suffers is
that the excess of government spending over government revenues represents
a net claim on the economy's real resources. Government purchases of goods
and services —airplanes for the military, for example, or bridges and
highways —clearlyconstitute uses of the economy's productive capacity
directly by the government. Government transfer payments —SocialSecurity
benefits, for example, or food stamps facilitate uses of the economy's
productive capacity, typically for consumption spending, not directly by
the government but by the recipients of these transfers. To the extent
that the government raises tax revenues commensurate with its spending,
it draws its claims on the economy's resources by simply taking income
(or profits) away from other potential claimants. The total claim on
resources represented by the government's spending does not disappear just
because the government runs a deficit, however. To the extent that the
government's revenues fall short of its expenditures, so that the government
must borrow to cover its deficit, the process of reducing the private
sector's claims on resources is indirect, relying not on coercion but on
market pressures.9
The nature of the market process by which the financing of a
government deficit reduces the private sector's use of resources depends
in turn on the posture of monetary policy. If monetary policy accommodates
the deficit, in effect monetizing the newly issued government debt,1° then the
resulting monetary growth when the economy is already fully employed will—13—
typically lead to price inflation, which reduces the private use of resources
by eroding people's purchasing power. In this case the government deficit
in effect claims resources that would have been used for consumption spending,
especially by those whose incomes and assets are most vulnerable to infla—
11
tion. The course of U.S. monetary policy since the late 1970s makes
such an outcome appear unlikely, however, and it is presumably undesirable
in any case. Once the economy has recovered from the recession, continued
accommodation of a sustained government deficit would only create anew the
inflationary spiral which led policy makers to take actions that produced
the recession in the first place.
If monetary policy does not accommodate the government deficit, then
the sale of government debt to the general public constitutes a direct
absorption of private saving and therefore reduces the amount of that
saving left to finance private investment. Here the market mechanism
that pre—empts the private sector's use of the economy's resources is not
price inflation but high interest rates. Since no one is forced to buy
government securities, additional sales of debt to finance the government's
deficit will be possible only if the government raises the interest rate
it pays on its debt. Once the government pays a higher interest rate,
however, private borrowers must also pay higher interest rates if they are
to sell their debt, but not all private borrowers will be willing to do so.
Some business firms will find that a planned investment opportunity is no
longer profitable at the new, higher financing cost, just as some families
will find that a planned new home or new car purchase is no longer affordable
at the new, larger monthly payment. Interest sensitive private spending,
including physical capital formation, will decline, and in the end the
economy's total investment will equal the deficit—reduced total saving.—14—
This effect of government deficits operating through higher interest
rates is always present, whether or not the economy is operating at full
employment; but when the economy is not fully employed other effects are
at work which may be equally or even more powerful. when the government
runs a larger deficit, it does so because it is spending more itself, or
because it is making larger transfer payments, or because it is collecting
less taxes. znyorall of these actions increase the demand for goods
andservices,either directly in the case of the government's ownspending
or indirectly in the case of the spending of transfer recipients and
taxpayers.The overall effect on total demand is the net of the negative
impact on interest-sensitive spending andthepositive impact of the
actions that immediately account for the deficit.
Although there are some conditions underwhichthe negative effects
on spending due to higher interest rates would outweigh the positive
effects that are more obviously tied to the government's spending and
taxing,12 it is highly unlikely that those conditions even roughly describe
the U.S. economy. Government deficits caused by an active fiscal policy
that is increasing government spending and/or reducing taxes therefore
raise the overall level of economic activity, at least as long as there is
room left to raise it. Further, if accelerator effects are sufficiently
powerful, the net effect on business investment spending could well be
positive rather than negative. Under conditions of ample underemployed
resources,with unused capacity and slack final demand dominating prospects
in many industries, the associated revival of overall business activity
couldeasily stimulate investment by more than the resulting higher interest
rates retard it. By contrast, when the economy is already fully employed,
there is no further stimulus to total demand, and the absorption of resources—15—
by the government deficit unambiguously reduces the saving available to
finance private investment.
In light of this sharpcontrastbetween the effects of active
deficits when the economy is fully employed and passive deficits when it
is not, in considering the interaction between the U.S. Government deficit
and private capital formation during the 1980s it is important to distinguish
explicitly three separate time periods: 1980-82, when the economy was
deeply under-employed and there was little if any active deficit; 1983—84
(and possibly into 1985), when the economy's resources are still substantially
underemployed, but with a significant active deficit; and the remainder of
the decade, when (in the absence of fresh disturbances) the economy's
resources will be more fully employed but under current policies there
will still be a large active deficit. During 1980-82 the realized government
deficit was not an impediment to private capital formation, because it
was not in large part an active deficit and because the economy thenhad
ample unemployed resources anyway. During 1983-84 the deficit is becoming
primarily an active deficit, but it will still probably not significantly
impede capital formation. At least during the early stages of the recovery,
the positive effect due to the increase in the overall level of economic
activity from the fiscal stimulation of the recovery will probably
outweigh the negative effect due to the resulting increase in interest
rates. Only during the years beginning around the middle of thedecade
is the government deficit likely to impair the economy's ability to finance
intended capital formation.
The U.S. Government deficit in the current fiscal year and the next,
therefore, is not really an object for serious concern in this context.
By contrast, the concerns expressed about the deficit prospects forthe—16—
balance of the 1980s are well taken and important. Sustained government
deficits in an approximately fully employed economy absorb private saving
that could otherwise finance private investment, and during the mid to
late 1980s this absorption threatens to assume magnitudes that are
unprecedented in U.S. peacetime experience. Especially since the performance
of capital formation in the last decade has already been weak (and weakening),
this prospect presents a major issue for public policy choice.—17—
II. A Strategy for Managing the Deficit
Table 4 shows the realized U.S. Government deficit for fiscal years
1980—82, together with separate deficit paths projected for fiscal years
1983—88 under three separate sets of assumptions about fiscal policy: a
"current services" path, indicating the Reagan Administration's projection
of the likely deficit underacontinuation of current tax and spending
policies (without the 1983 Social Security legislation, but with the
Administration's defense program); a "Reagan budget" path, indicating the
Administration's projection of the likely deficit after adoption of all
of its current tax and spending proposals; and an "adjusted Reagan" path,
which differs from the "Reagan budget" path only in omitting the effect
of the proposed (but unlikely) "contingency tax plan."3 The table shows
each deficit path both in dollar magnitudes and as percentages of gross
national product.14 All three deficit paths take on the same value for
1983, because the Administration's proposals apply only to fiscal years
1984 and beyond. The "Reagan budget" and "adjusted Reagan" paths are
identical through 1985, because the contingency tax plan as proposed is
scheduled to take effect only beginning in fiscal year 1986.
Although these three deficit paths clearly differ, with the "Reagan
budget" deficit showing the greatest relative shrinkage over time in
comparison with almost none at all for the "current services" deficit,
all three paths nevertheless show continuing federal deficits which, even
in relation to gross national product, are well outside the historical
experience reviewed in Section I, and which persist for some time. If
the problem at hand were to analyze the potential effects on capital
formation of such outsized deficits for just one year or two, then the annual





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































investment balance in Table 1 would be adequate. In order to assess the
likely implications of each deficit path over an extended period of time,
however, it is also useful to rely on some benchmark measure that goes
beyond these year-by-year flows. As in most analytical models of economies
that grow over time, a convenient form for such a benchmark is the relation-
ship between an accumulating asset (or liability) stock and the flow
of the economy's output as measured by gross national product.
The form of stock-flow measure that is most suitable for the purpose
of analyzing the longer-run effects of government deficits is the government
debt ratio, defined as the outstanding indebtedness of the U.S. Government
measured as a percentage of gross national product. The reason why the
government debt ratio is a helpful guide in this context is that a broader
stock-flow relationship, of which the government debt ratio is one component,
has exhibited a pronounced stability in the United States for many years.
In particular, the economy's total debt ratio, including the outstanding
debt not just of the federal government but of all U.S. borrowers other
than financial intermediaries,15 has displayed essentially no trend (and
only limited cyclical variation) throughout the post World War II period.
Moreover, the stability of the U.S. economy's outstanding debt in relation
to nonfinancial economic activity has not merely represented the stability
of a sum of stable parts. Neither private-sector debt nor government debt
has borne a stable relationship to economic activity, but their total has.
Figure 1 shows the yearend indebtedness of U.S. nonfinancial
borrowers, measured as percentages of fourth—quarter gross national product,
for each year since the end of the Korean War, as well as the corresponding
percentages for the end of the 1982 fiscal year.The top line in the























































































































































































































































































borrowers. The lines below divide this total into the respective
indebtedness of each of five specific borrowing sectors: the federal
government, state and local governments, nonfinancial business corporations,
other nonfinancial businesses, and households.
The strong stability of the total nonfinancial debt ratio shown
at the top of Figure 1 stands out plainly in contrast to the variation
of the individual sector components shown below. Although the total debt
ratio rose somewhat during the most recent business recession, as gross
nationalproduct in the denominator weakened sharply, the experience
ofa similar (though less pronounced) cyclicality in priorrecessions
suggests no interruption of the basic long—run stability. Inaddition,
the stability of the u.s. economy's total debt ratio is of longer standing
than the thirty years plotted in Figure 1. With the exception of a sharp
rise andsubsequent fall during the depression of the early 1930s (when
much of the debt on record had defaulted de facto) ,andtoa lesser extent.
duringWorld War II, the total debt ratio in the United States has been
16
essentially constant since the early l920s.
By contrast, the individual components of thetotal debt ratio
have varied in diverging ways both secularly and cyclically. In brief,
the post World War II secular rise in private debt has largelymirrored
a substantial decline (relative to economic activity)in public debt, while
cyclical bulges in public debt issuance have mostlyhad their counterpart
in the abatement of private borrowing. Households have almostcontinually
increased their reliance on debt in relation to their nonfinancial activity
throughout this period. Both corporations and unincorporatedbusinesses
have also issued steadily more debt, on a relative basis, exceptfor
temporary retrenchments during recession years.State and local governments—20—
steadily increased their relative debt issuing activity during the 1950s
and 1960s, but just as steadily reduced it during the 1970s. Finally,
except only for 1975-76 and 1980—82, years marked by large deficits due
to recession and its aftermath, the federal government has reduced its
debt ratio in every year to date since 1953, although this relative debt
reduction has also been slower in years when even milder recessions have
temporarily inflated the government's deficit (and, again, depressed gross
national product in the denominator).
This variation of the federal government's debt ratio provides a
useful perspective on the magnitude and import of the federal deficit.
During the post World War II period as a whole, the federal debt ratio
has declined not just from 62.9% in 1953 but from 103.4% in 1946. Indeed,
the 24-29% range in which the federal debt ratio fluctuated during the
1970s, and until 1982, corresponded favorably to the 27.4% value in 1918.
At the same time, the past decade has marked a departure from prior
experience in an important way. The years 1975 and 1976 were the first
since 1953 in which the government debt ratio rose, and the renewed decline
during 1977-79, which was subsequently reversed by the recession years
1980—82, was not sufficient to reduce the ratio to its 1974 low.
The federal government's debt ratio is relevant to the interaction
between fiscal policy and private capital formation because, in the context
of a stable economy—wide total debt ratio, it represents a useful summary
measure of the net impact of federal deficits on the environment for
private financing. If the government deficit is sufficiently small, or
if either real economic growth or price inflation is increasing the gross
national product sufficiently rapidly, then the government debt ratio
will be falling —asit was, almost continuously, throughout the first—21—
three decades following World War II. Conversely, if the deficit is
sufficiently large in relation to the economy's size and growth, then
the government debt ratio will be rising —asit was during 1975-76 and
1980—82. The analytical advantage of the stock-flow relationship is that,
by comparing the nominal stock of outstanding government debt to the
nominal gross national product, it implicitly allows not only for economic
growth but also for the much discussed (but in the end usually ignored)
real capital gain that the government earns by inflating away its prior
debt obligations.17 Hence the government debt ratio measure also illustrates
the lack of essential importance to be attached to a precisely balanced
government budget in a growing economy.
If the economy's total outstanding debt is approximatelystable in
relation to gross national product over time, then a sustainedmovement
in the government debt ratio implies an offsetting movementin the aggregate
private—sector debt ratio. A falling governmentdebt ratio like that
experienced during 1946—74 implies a rising private debt ratio,while a
rising government debt ratio like that during 1980—83 implies a falling
private debt ratio. A rising or falling private debt ratio, however,
simply indicates whether the economy's private sector is increasingits
outstanding debt more rapidly or more slowly than the economy'stotal
output is growing.
The relevance in turn of a rising or falling private debt ratio
for the economy's ability to undertake capital formation reflectsthe
traditional importance in the United States of debt financing of net
investment by the private sector, including both homebuilding andinvest-
ment in new plant and equipment. For example, the nonfinancial corporate
business sector, which typically accounts for nearly three—quartersof—22—
all U.S. investment in plant and equipment1 relied on external debt
financing for 64.3% of its total net sources of funds on average during
18
1956-80. Moreover, within this period business corporations' reliance
on external debt has shown an irregular but nevertheless increasing trend.
Unincorporated businesses financing new plant and equipment and households
financing new homebuilding have also relied heavily, and increasingly,
on borrowed sources of funds.
In the absence of a major change in financing patterns, therefore,
the economy's ability to achieve a greater capital intensity that is,
to increase its capital stock in relation to total output —dependsat
least in part on the private sector's ability to increase its debt in
relation to gross national product. Over time, however, the private
sector's debt ratio moves inversely with the government debt ratio. In
the end, the rise or fall of the pvernment debt ratio is therefore likely
to be an important factor shaping the relationship between growth of the
capital stock and growth of the economy's total output.
Figure 1 indicates the respective implications for the government
debt ratio associated with each of the three projected deficit paths shown
in Table 4. Just as there are large differences among the three projected
deficit paths, there are also significant differences among the respective
government debt ratio paths that each implies. With "current services"
deficits, the government debt ratio will continue to rise steadily, reaching
51.0% of gross national product by the end of fiscal year 1988 (in comparison
to 30.1% at the end of fiscal year 1982). Because the projected "Reagan
budget" deficits are the smallest of the three considered, they imply
the least rise in the government debt ratio. In this case the ratio will
actually peak at 40.2% of gross national product at the end of fiscal year—23—
1987 and then decline slightly to 39•5% a year later. Without the
contingency tax plan, however, the "adjusted Reagant' deficitswill again
imply a continuously rising government debt ratio, reaching 42.4%of gross
national product by the end of the period.
What stands out in Figure 1, however, is that all three of these
projected deficit paths will continue to carry the government debt
ratio sharply higher, instead of returning it tcMard the 24.8% postwar
low reached in 1974, or even stabilizing it at the 1982 level of 30.1%.
This projected further rise, equal to between 10% and 20% measured in terms
of gross national product, will raise the government debt ratio to levels
last experienced two decades or more ago. The "Reagan budget" path will
return the ratio to its 1964 level, while the "current services" path
will return the ratio to its 1957 level. As is apparent from Figure 1,
such a sustained increase in the government debt ratio will be unprecedented
in the U.S. postwar experience.
If the economy's total debt ratio remains approximately unchanged
over this period, then the increase of the government debt ratio by 10-20%
of gross national product implies a decline of roughly the same magnitude
in the private debt ratio)9 This sustained decline in the private debt
ratio will also, of course, be unprecedented in U.S. postwar experience.
As of the end of the 1982 fiscal year, the debt ratios of the household
and combined(corporate and unincorporated) nonfinancial business sectors
were 53.0%and54.7%,respectively.A 10-20%decline,applied either to
householdsor businesses alone or to both together, will represent a
substantial re—adjustment. Because such movements will differ so sharply
from prior experience, there is simply no way to say with confidence what
consequences they will bring. Nevertheless, the close historicalconnection—24—
between debt financing and private investment strongly suggests that the
market forces which compel the private sector to shrink its debt in relation
to economic activity will hardly be conducive to private capital formation.
The division of this relative debt decline between the household
and business sectors will also have important implications for the cornposi—
tion of U.S. capital formation, along with the effect of the total decline
on aggregate capital formation. Although a renewed depression of residential
construction could be sufficient to reduce household mortgage borrowing
by enough to absorb the entire private-sector decline,20 especially under the
smaller "Reagan budget" deficits, even that extreme outcome would probably
not permit any growth at all in the business sector's debt ratio nor would
sacrificing homebuilding to such an extent necessarily be desirable anyway.
More probably, business debt relative to income will also have to decline
in order to make room for the ballooning federal government debt.
Without the ability to raise external funds in the credit market,
the business sector will largely have to forego taking advantage of the
recently legislated investment incentives unless it turns massively to equity
financing —anunlikely prospect in light of traditional U.S. business
financing patterns.21 put in terms of the factors confronting business
decision making, the problem will be that the increased real cost of
financing (and, for some companies, reduced availability) will outweigh
the added attractiveness of new investment due to the large favorable
tax changes. Under these conditions business will probably invest
not more but less, and the U.S. economy's net capital formation rate will
decline still further.
The principal conclusion of this analysis, therefore, is that either
the current stance of U.S. fiscal policy or the policy stance proposed—25—
by the Reagan Administration is likely, over the medium run, to provide
a major impediment to achieving increased net capital formation and, in
turn, to meeting the increased productivity growth and other more targeted
economic objectives associated with increased capital formation. If fiscal
policy is not to have this presumably unintended and undesirable effect,
then the analysis developed here suggests, at a minimum, that it will be
necessary to reduce federal government spending or raise taxes (orboth)
sufficiently so that the implied increase in the federal government's
outstandingindebtedness over time merely keeps pace with the growth of
gross national product.22 In terms of averages for the fivefiscal years
1984-88, preventing any further increase in the government debt ratio
afterthe end of the current fiscal year would imply anannual deficit
of$122 billion, while returning the government debt ratio to its level
at the end of fiscal year 1982 would imply an annual deficit of only
$74 billion.23 By contrast, the 1984—88 averages for the three paths
shownin Table 4 are $285 billion for the "current services" deficit,
$169 billion for the "Reagan budget" deficit, and $198 billion for the
"adjusted Reagan" deficit without the contingency tax plan.
Stabilizing the government debt ratio would therefore require
verymajor changes even in comparison with the Reagan Administration's
budget proposals, not to mention currently existing tax and spending
legislation. The question that immediately arises, is what changes.
This crucial issue, however, is largely a matter of value judgments,
not economic analysis.
Thestandard trio of suggested ways to reduce the federal deficit
in the medium—run future includes cutting entitlement program benefits,
slowing the scheduled acceleration indefensespending, and—26—
eliminating either the reduction in individual income tax rates which took
effect in 1983 or the indexation of the tax code scheduled to take effect
in 1985. The magnitude of the change involved in reducing the average
1984-88 deficit to the $74—l22 billion range is such, however, that no
one among these three steps would by itself be sufficient. Table 5 shows
a decomposition of the U.S. Government budget position (including off-
budget outlays) into components roughly corresponding to these three
policy options, plus an additional expenditure category for net interest
payments, measured throughout as percentages of gross national product.
The table applies this decomposition to the actual outcomes for fiscal
years 1979 (the last in which the federal deficit did not exceed 2% of
gross national product) and 1982, as well as to the projected outcomes
for fiscal year 1983 and, on an annual average basis, each of the three
projected deficit paths for 1984-88 shown in Table 4.
What emerges clearly from this decomposition is that, at least in
comparison with 1979, substantially all of the increase in the
projected deficit for the 1980s is due to a reduction in revenues and an
24
increase in defense spending in relation to gross national product. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (diminished in part by the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982) will reduce total revenues by about
1% of gross national product in 1984—88, in comparison with 1979, while the
scheduled military program will raise defense spending by nearly 3%. The
adjustments in both of these trends proposed by the Reagan Administration,
even including the contingency tax plan, are relatively small. By contrast,
all other federal expenditures (other than net interest) will return to
their 1979 level in relation to gross national product under current



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































proposals. Such comparisons can never serve to resolve issues that
depend so heavily on value judgments, but they at least serve to place
in perspective the nature of the policy choices to be made.
Difficult as it would be to reduce the federal deficit to
$74-122 billion on average during 1984—88, even this magnitude of budgetary
change would still provide not a falling government debt ratio as in the
earlier postwar decades but merely a stable government debt ratio as in
the 1970s —hardly an enviable era for federal budgets, corporate finance,
or net capital formation. Achieving a more capital intensive economic
technology overall —thatis, a greater ratio of physical capital to output
—wouldmore likely require over time a rising business debt ratio, and
that in turn would require federal budget deficits small enough to allow
the government debt ratio to begin to decline once again. Nevertheless,
for the medium-run future that more ambitious goal now appears well beyond
reach.—28—
III. The Composition of Government Spending and Liabilities
The analysis in Sections I and II focuses on the implications for
private capital formation of fiscal policy at the level of the overall
federal budget deficit. These aggregate aspects of fiscal policy probably
capture the most powerful way in which government budget actions affect
private capital formation, but it is hardly the only way. The composition
of many of the major budget categories can importantly affect capital
formation too. Moreover, in recent years several budget categories have
undergone major composition changes that could significantly matter in
this regard. No of these, the composition of the government's spending
and of its liabilities, merit particular attention here.26
A. Composition of Expenditures
Table 6 shows the ownership composition of the net stock of fixed
nonresidential capital in the United States as of yearend 1981. The U.S.
Government holds only one—tenth of the nation's capital stock, and slightly
more than half of that consists of military installations and equipment.
In comparison to the private sector, or to state and local governments,
the federal government's participation in this context is small.
Nevertheless, the economy's productivity does not depend on private
capital alone, and "infrastructure" investment of the kind typically
put in place by government programs and subsequently held under government
ownership can makeanimportant contribution in this regard.27 In addition,
a substantial amount of the investment activities undertaken by state and
localgovernments rely heavily for financing on grants from the federal
government. In both senses the composition of federal government spending
determines another potentially important aspect of the economy's total
capital formation.TABLE 6









Notes: Values in billions of dollars.
Detail may not add to total because of rounding.
Government totals include government-owned enterprises.
Private—sector total excludes consumer-owned durable goods.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.—29—
Table 7 presents a summary of the U.S. Government's fixed nonresidential
investment spending, including both direct spending on military and other
fixed capital as well as grants to state and local governments for fixed
investment purposes. The table shows these investment flows in dollar
magnitudes and in relation to both total federal spending and total private—
sector gross investment in plant and equipment, as actually realized for
every fifth fiscal year since 1955 and as proposed by the Reagan Administra-
tion for the 1984 fiscal year. Direct federal government investment
spending for purposes other than military has remained small in relative
terms throughout this period, while investment—purpose grants to state
and local governments have been somewhat larger, and have steadily risen
in comparison to the private investment total. Both elements represent
contributions to the economic "infrastructure".28 Investment in military
capital has always represented at least half of all federal investment
spending, although there has been great variation over this period. Except
for a bulge in the late 1960s associated with the Viet t'1am War, military
investment as a share of total federal spending declined from the mid l950s
through the 1970s. The increase proposed by the Pagan Administration
for the 1984 fiscal year, however, will reverse part of this trend.
As a result of the irregular pattern of government investment
spending, together with the small post World War II base, the growth of the
nonmilitary federal government capital stock in the United States has not
slowed in recent years in parallel with the slower growth of the private
capital stock. Table 8 shows the respective constant-dollar growth rates
of the net capital stock held by the private sector, by state and local
governments, and by the federal government (including military and










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for 1981 and 1982 individually. Because of the decline in the school—age
population, and the completion of major investments in roads, sewers and
hospitals, the net capital stock owned by state and local governments
has slowed its growth almost to a standstill since the mid 1970s. By
contrast, during the late 1970s and through 1981, the federal government's
net stock of nonmilitary capital grew at a more rapid rate than at any
time since the early 1960s.
Nevertheless, at no time during the past quarter century —even
during the late 1970s —hasthe federal government's net stock of non-
military capital grown as rapidly as the private capital stock. In addition,
at no time during this period (except for isolated recession years) has the
federal nonmilitary capital stock grown as rapidly as gross national
product. Although the contribution of publicly owned capital to growth and
productivity is a subject about which little is known with any quantitative
precision, both the government and the private sector can add to the
economy's overall capital intensity. Instead, the U.S. economy has made
do each year with less federal government capital in relation to total
output. Policy changes to increase the economy's government-capital
intensity, or at the least to prevent it from declining further, would
involve significant changes in the mix of federal government spending
between investment and current outlays.
B. Composition of Liabilities
The outstanding debt of the U.S. Government will at least
double durinc the decade of the 1980s, even on the most optimistic plausible
assumptions about fiscal policy, economic performance, and consequent
budget deficits. Under the "current services" deficit path shown in Table 4,—31—
thegovernment's outstanding debt will more nearly triple. In the context
of this large arid rapidly growing stock of government liabilities to be
held by investors, the government's choice of the composition of its
liabilities —thatis, federal debt management —canalso have important
implications for private capital formation.
The basic reason why federal debt management can affect such
seemingly distant aspects of economic activity as business investment
is that neither borrowers nor lenders in financial markets are indifferent
to the maturity of the debt securities that they respectively issue and hold.
In order to reduce risks associated with the cost and availability of
futurerefinancing, businesses funding investments in long—lived plant and
equipment typically seek to finance those investments by issuing long-
termdebt. That preference would not matter if lenders were as willing to
advance funds at long term as at short term, but in fact most lenders
appear to prefer to hold short-term securities. Indeed, after their recent
experience with rapid inflation, high interest rates and volatile bond
prices, many traditional participants in the U.S. long-term markets are
now reluctant to commit funds to extended maturities, turning instead to
short-term instruments and other securities with more stable values. As
a result, businesses seeking to issue bonds to finance fixed capital
formation have found long—term financing more costly and, in many cases,
less available.
When the U.S. Government issues large volumes of long-term bonds,
it further raises the cost, and further reduces the availability, of long-
term financing for business and other private—sector borrowers. Discouraged
by an unreceptive bond market, a business seeking to finance a new plant,
or new equipment to modernize an old one, can respond in either of two—32—
ways. One is simply to cancel or curtail its planned investment. The other
is to go ahead with its investment on the basis of short-term financing,
hoping to fund out its liabilities in the future but for the present
accepting the deterioration in its financial structure. The experience
of the U.S. economy during recent years has exhibited both of these patterns.
Not only has net fixed investment declined, but business has increasingly
financed what investment it has undertaken at short term, so that many
corporations' balance sheets have weakened significantly.
If the government instead issued short—term securities, it would
free the limited supply of long-term lending to go to borrowers in the
private sector. In some cases the result would be additional private
capital formation, while in others it would be a sounder financial structure.
Either way, reliance on short—term financing in federal debt management
would promote a more productive and financially secure economy.
During most of the post World War II period, the U.S. Government
managed its debt in a manner consistent with leaving as much as possible
of the market's supply of long-term lending for private borrowers. When
the war ended, the outstanding marketable interest—bearing debt held by
private investors consisted mostly of long—term securities. Over the next
three decades, the Treasury typically refinanced maturing issues and
financed new budget deficits by relying on shorter—term securities, so
that the average maturity fell from almost ten years at yearend 1945 to
just under two and one—half years by yearend 1975. The percentage of the
outstanding debt maturing within one year more than doubled over these
three decades, while the percentage maturing in one to five years also
increased, and the percentage maturing in over five years declined





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since 1975, however, the federal government has pursued exactly
the opposite policy, placing sufficient reliance on long—term securities
to raise the overall average maturity outstanding back to four years by
the end of 1981. Except for a Gongressional delay in increasing the legal
limitation on long—term financing at current interest rates, the average
maturity would have been even greater by the end of 1982. This new debt
managementpolicy has involved a regular cycle of short- and medium—term
note issues, together with a series of new thirty—year bonds. The out-
standing U.S. Government debt maturing in more than ten years grew from only
$14 billion at yearend 1975 to $73 billion at yearend 1982. The net
increasein outstanding debt maturing in more than ten years —thatis,
gross new issues with more than ten years initial maturity, less purchases
by U.S. Government trust accounts, less the amount of outstanding issues
moving from over to under ten years maturity by the passage of time —
was$14 billion in 1981 alone and, despite the legislative delay, another
$7 billion in 1982. In comparison, the entire net volume of corporate
bonds issued each year by U.S. firms in nonfinancial lines of business was
only $24 billion in 1981 and $22 billion in 1982, and much of those totals
consisted of medium—term issues.
With its post-1975 debt management policy, therefore, the U.S.
Government has been lengthening its outstandingdebt just as rapidly
asthe policy of the previous three decades shortened the debt. In doing
so, it has been pre—empting for the government an historically
unprecedented (at least in peace time) share of the economy's long-term
borrowing and lending. The possible offsetting advantages associated
with the post-1975 debt management policy have included whatever effects
the development once again of a large and highly active trading market—34—
forlong-term U.S. Government securities may have had in stimulating the
marketfor long—term corporate securities, and hence making them also
more liquid. Both the increased size of the government's outstanding
long—term debt and the regular flow of new issues may have contributed in
this regard.Nevertheless, this active trading market is nowinplace,
andany further technical gains that wouldfollow from a continued average
lengthening of the federal debt are therefore problematical. By contrast,
the economic impact in terms of reduced private capital formation (and
weaker balance sheets) remains.
The effects of federal debt management policy on capital formation,
on patterns of corporate financing, and even on the overall level of
nonfinancial economic activity, can be substantial. Empirical evidence
suggests that debt management actions of a magnitude comparable to the
recent changes in the U.S. Government's debt management policy have sizeable
effects both in the financial markets and more broadly. In particular,
the evidence suggests that a federal debt management policy emphasizing
short— instead of long—term debt issues would lower yields on both
government and corporate long—term bonds and on corporate equities, would
raise yields on most short-term securities, and would stimulate output and
spending.29 The stimulus to spending would be disproportionately concentrated
in fixed investment, so that such a policy would not only increase the
economy's output but shift its composition toward additional private
capital formation. Because the induced change in the pattern of corporate
financing from short- to long-term borrowing (in response to the change in
relative interest rates) would be larger than the induced increase in
investment spending) ,sucha policy would also lead to an improvement
in thestructureof business balance sheets.—35—
The federal government's management of the composition of its
liabilities therefore constitutes still another dimension of policy choice
that can either foster or impede U.S. capital formation. As is the case
for the composition of federal spending, policies that would enhance the
economy's net capital formation rate would require significant changes
from the policies pursued in recent years.—36—
IV. Summary of Conclusions
The widespread public concern that the U.S. Government's budget
deficit will retard the economy's capital formation in the second half
of the l980s is warranted. In the absence of major policy changes, federal
government deficits will probably constitute a serious impedimentto any
increase in the U.S. economy's net investment rate, and may even depress
the investment rate still further, during the latter 1980s.
The source of this effect will be the continuing absorption, by
the federal government, of a large share of the nation's net saving. This
absorption is not a problem when the economy's resources are unutilized,
but it is a potentially serious problem at or near full employment.
Saving used to finance a government deficit in those circumstancesis not
available to finance private—sector capital formation. Under current
policies, increased government absorption of saving in the1980s will
easily outstrip any plausible increases in the saving rateassociated
with recently implemented tax changes or other factors. As a result,the
share of the nation's output devoted to net capital formation willat best
remain low.
A useful summary measure of the impact over time of government
deficits on the financing of capital formation is the government's
outstanding debt as a ratio to gross national product. The u.s.Government's
debt ratio declined steadily from the end of world War II untilthe early
1970s. The government debt ratio was then stable, on average, fromthe
early 1970s until the early l980s. It is now rising sharply and,under
either current legislation or the budget policies proposed bythe Reagan
Administration, it will continue to do so. This sustained upwardmovement
of the government debt ratio will be unprecedented in U.S. experience—37—
since World War II.
The reason why a rising government debt ratio bears negative
implications for private capital formation is that government debt and
private—sector debt have historically moved inversely in relation to
gross national product in the United States. A rising government debt
ratio over time therefore implies a sustained contraction of private
debt relative to the size of the economy. If market forces compel the
private sector to reduce its debt position, however, its ability to finance
increased capital formation will be dubious at best.
-ialternativefiscal policy that would at least stabilize the
gOvernment debt ratio over the medium—run future would require limiting
the average federal budget deficit during fiscal years 1984—88 to about
one-third of that likely under current tax and spending legislation, or
about one-half of that proposed by the Reagan Administration. Even then,
however,a stable rather than declining government debt ratio would only
replicate during the 1980sthe experience of the 1970s. A declining
governmentdebt ratio (and rising private debt ratio), as during the first
threedecades after World War II,is probably well beyond reach.
Inaddition to these implications of the overall stance of fiscal
policy in the aggregate, the composition of the U.S. Government's spending
also shapes prospects for capital formation, as does the composition of
the government's liabilities. Recent developments have borne negative
implications for capital formation in both of these respects as well as
in the aggregate. The federal government's direct investment in nonmilitary
fixed capital is not keeping pace with the economy's growth, nor are
federal grants to support capital investment by state and local governments.
At the same time,therecent emphasis on long-term borrowing in financing—38—
thefederal deficit has increased, rather than reduced, the extent to which
governmentborrowing interferes with the financing ofprivate capital
formation.ppropriate changes both in federal spending priorities arid
in federal debt management wouldfavorably affect U.S. capital formation,
although in neither case would the likely effects be as large or as important
as a major reduction of the average deficit over time to the level consistent
with maintaining a stable government debt ratio.Foothotes
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1. Data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic
Analysis) and the u.s.Departmentof Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
2. See Denison (1979) and Kendrick (1979) for comprehensive treatments
of factors contributing to changes in U.S. economic growth and
productivity trends. For more specific (and conflicting) assessments
of the role of fixed capital, see Baily (1981) and Bosworth (1982).
3. This trend has already slowed, however, and it will probably turn
around during the l980s. One reason is the slower growth, and in
some cases the contraction, of public school systems associated with
the declining school—age population. Another is the sharp rise in
general government operating deficits associated with tax limitations
or reductions in many states. See Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) for a
summary of the funding status of state arid local government pensions.
4. The division of gross plant and equipment investment into respective
components representing net investment and depreciation depends, of
course, on an accurate estimate of the corresponding depreciation
rate. In practice, this estimation hinges crucially on issues of
inflation accounting. See, for example, Shoven and Bulow (1975).
5.in 1955 the economy's gross stock of fixed nonresidential private
capital, measured on a constant—dollar basis, consisted of 56.7%
structures and 43.3% equipment. In 1981 the corresponding composition
was 48.3% structures and 51.7% equipment.(Data, here as in the
following paragraph, are from the u.s. cepartment of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis.)
6. For comparison, the deficit in the 1982 fiscal year was 4.2% of gross
national product.(The data in Table 1 apply to calendar rather than
fiscal years.) Estimates attributed to the Administration, both here
and below, are from the Office of Management and Budget.
7. On the basis of a priori considerations alone, even the sign of the
saving response to interest rate levels is indeterminate; see, for
example, Feldstein (1978). For examples of the conflicting conclusions
reachedin the corresponding empirical literature, see Boskin (1978)
Howreyand Hymans(1978), andSummers (1981).8. It is always possible to argue that, even in this context, private
investment would be greater if the government ran a high—employment
surplus, but such a claim presumably ignores any accelerator effects
due to the still further depression of aggregate demand. For evidence
on accelerator versus interest—rate determinants of investment, see
Kopcke (1977) and Berson and Roley (1981).
9. In addition to the claim on resources represented by the financing
of its own deficit, the government also pre—empts resources when it
guarantees the debt of private borrowers. The reason is simply that
government guaranteed debt, like the government's own debt, takes
precedence in lenders' portfolios over potentially defaultable privat
debt. In addition to the spending indicated in Table 3, in the 1982
fiscal year the U.S. Government extended $47.6 billion in direct loans
and guaranteed a further $53.7 billion of private loans.(Data are
from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget.) For an analysis of
the economic effects of federal credit programs, see Penner and
Silber (1973).
10. Contrary to widespread popular belief, an "accommodative" monetary
policy in this sense does not mean that the central bank purchases
all debt issued by the federal government. In a fractional reserve
banking system, the great bulk of the "monetization" of the deficit
is done by the commercial banking system. The monetary authority
purchases just enough of the government debt to provide the necessary
reserves.
11. In this case private investment could even be higher as a result of
the monetized deficit if the (temporary) increase in real money balances
also reduced interest rates.
12. See, for example, Blinder and Solow (1973) and Friedman (1978).
13. Data are from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The reason
for omitting the "contingency tax plan" is that, as of the time of
writing, it appears to have little or no prospect of passage by
Congress. Moreover, even the Administration's support for its own
proposal seems questionable.
14. The gross national product values used are those actually realized
for 1980-82 and those projected by the Administration for 1983—88.
15. The reason for excluding the debt of financial intermediaries is simply
to avoid double counting.
16. See Friedman(1980)for a discussion of the behavior of the total
debtratioduring 1918—78. Friedman (1982) sets out several behavioral
hypotheses that could explain this phenomenon.
17. This capital gain is a key part of the process by which inflation
transfers resources form the private sector to the government, as
describedin Section I. For a calculation of this capital gain during
thepost World War II period, see Eisner and Piepers (forthcoming).18. The remaining net sources were equity issues (5.2%) and retained
domestic and foreign earnings net of inventory valuation adjustments
(30.5%). Net sources of funds in turn accounted for 56.9% of
nonfinancial corporations' total sources of funds, with capital
consumption allowances contributing 43.1%.(Data are from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.) For a review of nonfinancial
corporate business financing patterns in the United States, see Friedman
(198la).
19. It is at least possible, of course, that some fundamental change
in economic behavior could cause the economy's total debt ratio to
rise more than just cyclically, thereby enabling the private sector
debt ratio to remain steady or even rise despite a rising government
debt ratio. In light of the stability of the total debt ratio documented
in Friedman (1980, 1982), however, it is not clear what would induce
such a change during the 1980s; see also the analysis of public and
private debt ratio interactions in Friedman (1981b). The argument
here also rests on the assumption that state and local governments
will continue to maintain about the same debt ratio as in recent
years.
20. Mortgage debt typically constitutes nearly two-thirds of all debt
owed by U.S. households.
21. It is also possible that an increase in equity financing could
make up for the reduced business reliance on debt funds, and thereby
facilitate an increased capital fonnation rate despite a declining
business debt ratio. Indeed, during the first half of 1983, net
new issues of equities by nonfinancial business corporations averaged
a record $34.0 billion per annum, equal to two—fifths of their total
issues of equity plus credit market debt instruments, and well above
the previous record of $12.9 billion set in 1980. (Data are from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.) This surge
was probably a result of the large increase in equity prices in the
immediately prior half—year, however. In light of historical patterns
of U.S. corporate financing, even the continuation of net equity
issues at this pace —much less at a sufficient pace to make up the
difference between a rising and a falling business debt ratio —
appearsunlikely.
22. Tobin (1982) has also advanced an analysis along these lines.
23. These calculations again rely on the Administration's estimates of
nominal income.
24. Different benchmark dates would yield different comparisons, of course;
see, for example, footnote 25 below.
25. In comparison to the early l960s, however, other expenditures relative
to income will remain sharply higher. Similarly, in comparison to
the early l960s, military expenditures have shrunk relative to income.26. A third and perhaps even more obvious example, which lies beyond
the scope of this paper, is the composition of government revenues.
See the papers by uerbach, Hausman, and Shoven in this volume.
27. Investment in human capital is also an important determinant of the
economy's productivity; this subject lies beyond the scope of this
paper, however.
28. Of the $285 billion of federally owned net nonresidential capital
stock (other than military) indicated in Table 6, $231 billion, or
81% consisted of structures. Similarly, of the $1,813 billion indicated
for state and local governments, $1,726 billion, or 95%, consisted
of structures. By contrast, of the $2,849 billion indicated for the
private sector, only $1,525, or 54%, consisted of structures.
29. See Friedman (198lc) and Roley (1982).References
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